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COMMENT
FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
A CHALLENGE TO THE POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of the law of mergers under section seven of the Clayton
Act' has been characterized by the continuing emergence of new doctrines
fashioned to plumb the depths of congressional intent on the one hand and to
keep apace with a rapidly evolving national economic structure on the other.
As a result of the dramatic diversification and conglomeration of American
corporations in the last decade, enforcement agencies and the courts recently
have struggled with the elusive principles of potential competition. Yet
despite ambitious promotion of that doctrine by both the Justice Department
and the FTC,2 recent decisions of the Supreme Court 3 indicate a deep-felt
judicial caution, perhaps casting a shadow of doubt on the economic
coherence4 and the legal desirability of a wholesale embrace of the twin ideas
of actual potential and future potential competition.
Recent business developments, moreover, present significant new chal-
lenges to the law of mergers, challenges which may demand as extensive an
expansion of legal mechanisms in this decade as the conglomerate boom
summoned in the last. In the ten year period from 1963 to 1973, direct foreign
capital investment in the United States mushroomed from 7.9 billion to 17.7
billion dollars.5 Despite a present lag, such investments probably will continue.
Principally as a result of the actions of corporations from sophisticated foreign
economies such as those of Japan, Germany and the English speaking
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Section 7 provides in pertinent part: "No corporation engaged in
commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock... or any part
of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." Id.
2. See Berger & Peterson, Conglomerate Mergers and Criteria for Defining Potential En-
trants, 15 Antitrust Bull. 489, 500-03 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Berger & Peterson]; Robinson,
Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 243, 257 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Robinson]. For a history of the Justice Department's promotion of the concept in one area, see
Comment, Bank Mergers and Potential Competition, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 767 (1975).
3. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 639 (1974) (refusing to reach the
question reserved in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973)); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
4. The functional aspects of the potential competition concepts are not frequently found in
reality, according to a number of commentators. See, e.g., Note, United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corporation: Potential Competition Re-examined, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 837, 848-53 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Falstaff]; Comment, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competi-
tion Doctrine, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 156, 168-71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Toehold].
5. Elmer & Johnson, Legal Obstacles to Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Corporations, 30 Bus.
Law. 681, 682 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Elmer & Johnson]. However, during the first nine months
of 1975, foreign investments in the United States declined. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1975, at 4, col. 1.
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nations, foreign investment in the United States now is equal to one-fifth that
invested by Americans abroad. 6 Further, developing nations, demanding
higher prices in return for raw materials, have begun to re-invest excess
capital in more sophisticated economies. It has been estimated that the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) may gather as much
as 600 billion dollars in oil revenue during the next four years alone.7
These developments have attracted the avid attention of the popular press,
and, causing something of a "takeover paranoia," have led to a re-examina-
tion of the open door investment policy of the federal government.8 Yet for the
federal courts and the administrative agencies the problem is more immediate,
because the antitrust principles of section seven must be applied now to foreign
entrants. Consequently, the problematical doctrine of potential competition will
be tested in yet another set of circumstances.
It is the thesis of this Comment that the current modes of legal analysis in
merger cases are inadequate to deal effectively with the peculiar economic and
concomitant legal aspects of foreign entry. Even without reaching broader
questions of foreign policy, 9 an analysis of the transnational merger leads to
the conclusion that, in at least three areas, there should be a rethinking of
judicial construction of the antimerger law. These three areas include the
definition of the geographic market in which the effect on competition is to be
assessed, the nature and the severity of barriers to entry into that market, and the
permissible modes of foreign entry into a domestic market.
Because these areas present problems which run deeply into antitrust law,
and because recent Supreme Court decisions appear to signal new directions,
this Comment will first analyze the fundamental elements of section seven
construction. Part II will look to the definition of the product market, examining
the interrelationship between product definition and actual potential competi-
tion. Part lI1 will evaluate the geographic market, particularly the problems
presented by transnational definitions. Part IV will examine barriers to entry.
Here the unique economic and the collateral legal restraints placed upon the
6. Rose, The Misguided Furor About Investments from Abroad, Fortune, May 1975, at 170,
173 [hereinafter cited as Fortune].
7. Farmanfarmaian, How Can the World Afford OPEC Oil?, 53 Foreign Affairs 201 (Jan.
1975). However, one Treasury official has been quoted as saying: "From everything we have been
able to learn, the OPEC investor is behaving like a nervous grandma who turns her money over
to Morgan Guaranty and says: 'Here, invest it as conservatively as possible.' " Fortune, supra
note 6, at 172.
8. Foreign Investors Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (Oct. 26, 1974); see
H.R. Res. 1296, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 Cong. Rec. H8852 (1974). A spate of bills now pending
in Congress would operate to restrict control and debt ownership by foreign interests. Young,
The Acquisition of United States Businesses by Foreign Interests, 30 Bus. Law. 111, 112-13 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Young]. The most extreme proposal would give the President authority to veto
foreign acquisitions of more than five percent of almost any publicly held corporation. Fortune,
supra note 6, at 170.
9. While such questions are beyond the scope of this Comment, issues of foreign policy may,
in some cases, be determinative. Most courts have been able to avoid passing on questions of
policy. See, e.g., Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 418-19 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
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foreign entrant will be discussed. Part V then will examine the modes of entry by
a foreign corporation into a domestic market.
II. PRODUCT DEFINITION
In recent years the issue of relevant line of commerce increasingly has been
settled by stipulation. 10 This fact, however, does not indicate necessarily that
problems of product definition have been settled. Rather, when the traditional
test-cross-elasticity of demand-has been argued, the issue has been hotly
disputed. This has been so particularly in section two I monopoly cases, the
classic example being United States v. GrinneU Corp., 12 the most recent, the
Government's action against IBM.1 3 Under section seven, the most persis-
tently difficult product definition cases have been product extension mergers.
The concept of cross-elasticity emerged from an exhaustive economic study
of the flexible wrapping business in United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. 14 Rejecting the proposition that the defendant had
monopolized the cellophane market, the Supreme Court found a broader "line
of commerce" through a recognition that distinct but related products may
compete so closely as to comprise together one product market. "This
interchangeability is largely gauged by the purchase of competing products for
similar uses considering the price, characteristics and adaptability of the
competing commodities."I s
Functionally, cross-elasticity operates to lessen the possible anticompetitive
impact of overpricing by any single corporation. If elasticity is extremely high
in a given product, the slightest price increase by one producer will lead
purchasers to abandon that seller and buy elsewhere. If elasticity is low, or is
offset by other competitive factors such as consumer preferences or limit-
pricing, the price differential must be more significant before buyers will
switch products. A series of Supreme Court cases has advanced price sen-
sitivity as the key to cross-elasticity, and to the product market.1 6
Cross-elasticity found its way into section seven merger cases in a decision
10. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 527 (1973); United
States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 161 (1964). Particularly in gasoline cases, the
market definitions have appeared "obvious" to the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
11. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp. 1, 1975). Section 2 provides in pertinent part
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony...." Id.
12. 384 U.S. 563, 575 (1966).
13. United States v. IBM, Inc., Civ. No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969); the relevant
product market is described as a "major issue" in this case. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1975, at 53,
col. 8.
14. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
15. Id. at 380-81.
16. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 17-22 infra. On the relationship between
price and cross-elasticity, see Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 282, 314 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Posner].
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which had purely horizontal and purely vertical aspects, Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States. 17 Although there the defendant proposed an extreme frac-
tionalization of product markets, the Court had no great difficulty in applying
du Pont-shoes are not very interchangeable. Although Brown Shoe
characterized horizontal mergers as those involving "comparable goods or
services,"18 the cross-elasticity analysis in merger cases remained essentially
uncomplicated before the emergence of the product extension acquisition.
Two years after Brown Shoe, in United States v. Continental Can Co., 19 the
Supreme Court barred an acquisition of the third largest bottle producer by
the second largest can manufacturer. Over the dissent of Justice Harlan, who
claimed that the Court was creating a new line of commerce, 20 the decision
ruled that "[w]here the area of effective competition cuts across industry lines,
so must the relevant line of commerce; otherwise an adequate determination
of the merger's true impact cannot be made."12 1
Finding bottles and cans to be in active competition with each other, and
also finding a foreclosure of potential competition between the merging
parties, Continental Can identified a broader product market, this time to
reach a section seven violation. 22
Similarly, in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 23 the Court upheld the
Commissioner's finding that the purchase of Clorox, the nation's largest seller
of liquid bleach, by the respondent, a detergent corporation forty times
Clorox's size, violated the Clayton Act, even though the acquiring firm had
never produced or sold liquid bleach. However, here the decision was not
based upon a finding of a broader line of commerce encompassing the
products of both firms. Instead, the Court held that the inflow of Procter's
capital would serve to entrench Clorox's already dominant position in the
17. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
18. Id. at 334. The decision was the first authoritative post-amendment construction of the
Clayton anti-merger law; Brown Shoe set forth rules as to all the fundamental elements. "The
outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use
or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it. However,
within this broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute
product markets for antitrust purposes." Id. at 325, citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-95 (1957) (footnote omitted).
19. 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
20. Id. at 476-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 457. The decision was the first to dilute the careful market definitions mandated by
Brown Shoe. "Where a merger is of such a size as to be inherently suspect, elaborate proof of
market structure, market behavior and probable anticompetitive effects may be dispensed with in
view of § 7's design to prevent undue concentration." Id. at 458 (Continental Can Co., holding
33% of the can industry, was considered already "dominant").
22. Id. at 463.
23. 386 U.S. 568 (1967). Earlier, in United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158
(1964), the Supreme Court barred a product extension joint venture, and identified actual
potential competition. Id. at 174. According to a recent decision, a product extension merger
under the Procter & Gamble case requires some degree of "product affinity" between the merging
parties. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 859 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974), noted in 43 Fordham L. Rev. 484 (1974).
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liquid bleach business. Unlike Continental Can, no new "product" was
defined, but again the Court found an elimination of actual potential competi-
tion, stating that it was "clear that the existence of Procter at the edge of the
industry exerted considerable influence on the market.11
2 4
A comparison of Continental Can and Procter & Gamble illustrates how the
product extension cases appear to have minimized the importance of the
cross-elasticity test in favor of the new concept of actual potential competi-
tion. The cross-elasticity test was conspicuously absent in Procter & Gamble;
the case reached the Supreme Court escorted by a hundred page FTC
decision, 25 which urged the Court to adopt the less precise analytic principles
of entrenchment and potential competition.
It is not being suggested that the courts have totally abandoned cross-
elasticity in favor of actual potential competition. Rather, it appears that in its
haste to adopt the idea of "edge effect" and limit-pricing, the Court did not
stop to consider how this new approach could be reconciled with the fun-
damentals of du Pont, and how it affects product market definition.
The most recent Supreme Court merger case in which the product line was
seriously disputed was United States v. General Dynamics Corp.2 6 In that
case the district court, 27 applying du Pont, found sufficient cross-elasticity
between coal and other forms of fuel to designate the product market as all
energy products. 28 In the Supreme Court, the majority deemed this finding
"superfluous" in view of the lower court's finding of no substantial lessening of
competition. 2 9 In light of the long series of merger cases which have man-
dated that product and market definitions are the starting points of the
analysis,30 the General Dynamics Court's ability to reach a section seven
decision without a product definition is, to say the least, remarkable. 3' Only
the dissent saw fit to- apply du Pont, and there Justice Douglas found the
market to be coal, not energy, 32 on the basis of findings which led the judge
24. 386 U.S. 568, 581 (1967). The Court found that there was actual influence on the relevant
market, that the defendant could have entered de novo, and that the defendant was the most
likely potential entrant. See Pts. IV & V infra.
25. In re Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465 (1963). The FTC advanced a detailed theory
of limit-pricing and its relation to barriers to entry. Id. at 1550-55.
26. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
27. 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
28. 415 U.S. at 491.
29. Id. at 510-11. The lower court relied on post-acquisition evidence to conclude that the
acquired firm had lost the ability to compete effectively. See note 33 infra. One commentator has
opined that the decision indicates an increased deference to the findings of district judges.
Robinson, supra note 2, at 246.
30. E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see cases discussed in PL I
infra.
31. See Moyer, United States v. General Dynamics Corporation: An Interpretation, 20
Antitrust Bull. 1, 14-22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Moyer].
32. Justice Douglas concluded that the district court's own findings demonstrated a non-
elasticity between coal and other energy products, mandating a conclusion that coal was the
relevant product market. 415 U.S. 486, 515 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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below to conclude the contrary, and which allowed the majority to avoid the
issue altogether.
The failure to define a product market may not have been fatal to a case as
unique as General Dynamics, which perhaps can be explained on other
grounds. 33 However, the decision evidenced a disregard for the one part of
the section seven test which appeared somewhat settled. Aside from the
problems inherent in abandoning a competition definition of product, an error
in this part of the analysis can fatally infect the geographic market defini-
tion. 34 Yet, as will be seen, that definition also suffers when the courts move
away from competition definitions and toward industry definitions. Despite
the warning of Justice Stewart that "the purpose of § 7 is to protect
competition, not to protect competitors, ' ' 35 the courts have continued to
analyze cases in terms of competitors. As will become clear, this change in
focus wreaks havoc with a transnational merger evaluation.
III. GEOGRAPHIC MARKET DEFINITION
The courts have avoided precise geographic market delineation in merger
cases for a number of reasons. First, as in product definition, domestic cases have
often settled the issue by stipulation. 36 Secondly, recent cases have involved true
industrial giants that operate nationwide; the courts have been impressed by
their pure size and have taken refuge in national market definitions. 3 7 Third,
some cases have considered the outer lines of political subdivisions, such as state
or national boundaries, to be markets, due to unique regulations those juris-
dictions impose. 38 Finally, the courts have been trapped by industry delinea-
33. It has been well argued that the Dynamics Court has established a new version of the
"failing company doctrine" of International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930). Robinson,
supra note 2, at 250-52; see Moyer, supra note 31, at 12. This doctrine was rarely applied because
its requirements were so stringent. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962)
(imminent financial collapse and unsuccessful attempts at less anticompetitive alternatives). The
most extreme statement of the doctrine also required a third criterion; namely, the inability of the
corporation to continue to function in receivership or through reorganization. Citizen Publishing
Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969). As to the potential impact of the Dynamics
approach, see Pt. V infra.
34. This is particularly acute when the product and market definitions are closely interre-
lated, as perhaps they should be. See Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market
Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 Antitrust Bull. 45, 76 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Elzinga].
35. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 282 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
accord, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (interpreting congressional
intent).
36. E.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 527 (1973); United States v.
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). The remand in the former case illustrates that, for
the government, the stipulation as to New England may have been a mistake; removal of actual
potential competition of Falstaff appears to have been in the New York area. See United States
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (D.R.I. 1974).
37. E.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (monopoly case); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441
(1964).
38. See text accompanying notes 67-70 infra.
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tions, adopting sales territories such as states or nations for the same reason that
the parties chose them in their businesses--convenience. 39
The origins of the "section of the country test" warrant re-examination. The
Supreme Court, in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,40
warned that the geographic market, "as most concepts in law or economics,
cannot be measured by metes and bounds."'4 Rather, geographic market, like
product market, must be delineated on the basis of a functional examination
of competition. This is the rule established by Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 42 in which Justice Clark wrote for the Court:
[Tjhe area of effective competition in the known line of commerce must be charted by
careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, and to which the
purchaser can practicably turn for supplies. 4 3
The market definition of Tampa Electric was developed in the context of
section one of the Sherman Act;4 4 the Brown Shoe case, a post-amendment
section seven Clayton Act case, adopted a similar test for the horizontal
aspects of the merger.45 Refusing to find that the relevant markets were
separate urban and suburban areas, the Brown Shoe Court, approving a
competition definition, upheld the trial judge's conclusion that effective actual
competition cut across city lines. 46 Similarly, in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank,47 the court employed a competition definition of geographic
market, quoting Tampa Electric as controlling authority. 48
39. One prominent economist has warned that the use of "selling territories" is suspect; such
designations have no necessary relationship to relevant geographic markets. Elzinga, supra note
34, at 71-72.
40. 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (alleging violations of sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act).
41. Id. at 611. Put another way, geographic markets are not really geographic. Elzinga, supra
note 34, at 47.
42. 365 U.S. 320 (1961). For an excellent discussion of the conceptual bases of the Tampa
decision, see Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under
the Clayton Act [§ 3], 1961 Sup. CL Rev. 267.
43. 365 U.S. at 327. Professor Elzinga refers to an almost identical theory as the Marshallian
conception of economic markets. "A market encompasses the primary demand and supply forces
that determine a product's price and the geographic market area is the area that encompasses
these buyers and sellers." Elzinga, supra note 34, at 47.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Supp. 1, 1975). Tampa Electric
involved the Court's review of a declaratory judgment which held illegal under section 3 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970), a requirements contract between the parties. In reversing the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court relied on the analyses of the leading
cases interpreting section one of the Sherman Act. See 365 U.S. at 325-34.
45. "The geographic market selected must.., both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of
the industry and be economically significant." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
336-37 (1962). However, the decision's use of the term "industry" foreshadowed the shift from
market to industry focus. See text accompanying notes 49-66 infra.
46. 370 U.S. at 338-39. Relying on an extensive forty-city survey, the district court came to
the reasoned conclusion that the acquisition foreclosed actual competition in a series of local
markets. Id.
47. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
48. Id. at 359. The decision stated that the question of substantial lessening of competition
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Regrettably, the Tampa Electric test did not long survive in the majority
opinions of the Supreme Court. In United States v. Grinnell Corp., 49 the
Court in a section two Sherman Act case discounted the fact that the
defendants' services were available only in a series of twenty-five mile radius
areas, and ruled that:
the relevant market for determining whether the defendants have monopoly power is
not the several local areas which the individual stations serve, but the broader national
market that reflects the reality of the way in which they built and conduct their
business.5 0
Exposition of the Tampa analysis was relegated to the vehement dissent of
Justice Fortas. 5t In defense of Grinnell, it could be argued that a monopoly
case properly may look more to the structure of the monopolist and less to the
areas of effective competition. 52 However, in a merger case decided the same
day,5 3 the Court, faced with a difficult geographic market definition, effec-
tually threw up its hands and, like Grinnell, adopted an industry focus rather
than a market focus. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co. 54 barred a horizon-
tal merger without deciding whether the geographic market comprised the
single state in which the acquired corporation manufactured, the three states
in which competition between the merging parties was allegedly foreclosed, or
the broader national market. To the surprise of the Government, which was
struggling to overcome a district court dismissal on the ground that a
geographic market had not been proven," the Court leapfrogged to the
ultimate question. Pabst Brewing ruled, in effect, that to bar a horizontal
merger in a concentrated industry where the number of competitors had
declined, no exact geographic market need be shown. 5 6 It was this ruling
which led Justice Harlan to accuse the majority of emasculating the phrase
"in any section of the country."
' 57
must be based upon "a firm understanding of the structure of the relevant market." Yet the case
also warned courts to be "alert to the danger of subverting congressional intent by permitting a
too-broad economic investigation." Id. at 362.
49. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
50. Id. at 576. In support of its definition, the Court cited the national planning of the
defendants, the presence of multi-state contracts, national ratemaking and terms of contracts, and
national certification by insurance issuers. Id. at 575.
51. "The central issue is where does a potential buyer look for potential suppliers of tie
service-what is the geographical area in which the buyer has, or, in the absence of monopoly,
would have, a real choice as to price and alternative facilities?" Id. at 589 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
52. Almost by definition, a full-blown monopoly is nearly co-extensive with the relevant
market which it controls. The first major monopoly case took such a focus on the defendant. See
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
53. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
54. Id.
55. 233 F. Supp. 475, 481 (E.D. Wis. 1964), rev'd, 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
56. 384 U.S at 549-53. Pabst relied heavily on the existence of a "trend" towards concen-
tration. Id. at 551-53. See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1966).
57. 384 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, concluding that the government
had indeed proven its case, concurred in the result. Id.
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Although the Pabst decision has been severely criticized,5 8 its wide-open
industry focus is still favored by the Court. In General Dynamics, the
Supreme Court appeared to employ a similar analysis, reaching a conclusion
that there was no substantial lessening of competition in "any" area of the
country, viz., nowhere in the industry involved. 9 This apparently relieved
the Court of the necessity of passing on market definition. 60 However, in
United States v. Marine Bancorporation,6 1 the Supreme Court appeared to
limit the Pabst approach, holding that the relevant geographic market must
be co-extensive with the phrase "section of the country" and that both are
equivalent to "the area in which the acquired firm is an actual, direct
competitor." 62 According to one prominent commentator, the Marine
Bancorporation decision "squarely reaffirms the necessity for delineating a
realistic geographic market." 63
This is not necessarily the case. The disintegration of the competition
definition of market in merger cases has been accompanied by the emergence
of the very different industry focus. If properly used, such a focus could signal
a return to the basic economic philosophy of Tampa Electric." However, it
appears that instead of concentrating on lines of industry competition, this new
focus looks to industry structure, thereby perhaps infringing upon the "line of
commerce" inquiry, and confusing what is essentially a separate issue. 65
Nowhere is this industry focus better illustrated than in the potential
competition cases. By looking to and comparing industry structure rather
than lines of supply and demand, the courts have been able to reach the
elusive principles of potential competition. 66
The bank merger cases suggest yet another approach to market
definition-that of delineation by regulation. While both Philadelphia Na-
tional and Marine Bancorporation appear to look to lines of supply and
demand, 67 the Government in the latter case argued that entire states are
58. Professor Elzinga devoted an entire article to the task of dismembering both the
government's arguments and the Court's opinion in Pabst. Upon applying an economic test
fashioned to ascertain lines of supply and demand, Professor Elzinga concluded that the relevant
market in Pabst was different from any of those propounded. Elzinga, supra note 34, at 50-75.
59. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510-11 (1974).
60. Id.; see Moyer, supra note 31, at 14-19.
61. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
62. Thus the Court rejected the government's argument that, for purposes of banking, a state
could be a relevant market. Id. at 620-22. See text accompanying notes 67-70 infra.
63. Robinson, supra note 2, at 258. "[A] persuasive case can be made that the present Court is
faithful both to the legislative history of the statute and to the principles... [of] Brown Shoe."
Id. at 259-60.
64. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
65. See Elzinga, supra note 34, at 60-61.
66. In a potential competition case, instead of looking to supply and demand, the court
counts competitors and judges their behavior. This approach appears to confuse the market defi-
nition with the barriers to entry analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367
F. Supp. 1226, 1254 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
67. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra. In Marine Bancorporation, the Court approved
a market definition which reasonably identified the area in which the "banks offer the major part
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proper relevant markets, in light of the state-by-state regulation of banking.6"
This theory was rejected as inapposite to the facts of the case, 69 but the
regulation definition someday may appear in a proper context. For instance, if
two leading multibank holding companies in a given state were to merge, the
courts would probably find a foreclosure of competition on two levels-the
several local communities in which the parties compete, and the entire state in
which the banks operate. The outer boundaries of the latter market would be
defined because of state regulation. In addition, the casual designation of
a national market in a large number of antimerger cases is in fact a regulation
definition approach, based on the outer limits of the jurisdiction of the United
States.70
Thus, it appears that the courts have considered at least three different
methods of geographic market definition. These include (1) the Tampa test of
definition by competition, which delineates markets on the basis of lines of
supply and demand; (2) the Pabst focus on industry structure, which assesses
competitive impact more broadly by looking to trends of concentration
industry-wide; (3) the regulation definition, which sets the boundaries of
markets because of the limits of jurisdictions. It is apparent that these tests
are often combined, 7 1 and some are certainly more applicable to specific
industries. 72 However, there is little indication that even the Supreme Court
is aware of when it is using the different market tests.
While the distinction between these modes of market definition may appear
elusive, in the case of a foreign entry the method employed can produce
divergent results. This is well illustrated by the situation in FTC v. British
Oxygen Co., 73 where the district court enjoined a tender offer takeover of
Airco, the second largest American gas producer, by the largest British
industrial gas manufacturer (BOC). Subsequently, an FTC administrative
law judge, finding significant foreclosures of actual and actual potential
competition between the parties, ordered the British company to divest itself
of its holdings in Airco. Further, the judge found that the acquired firm
would be entrenched in the domestic market.7 4 While the report of the FTC
order does not expressly reveal an attempt at market definition, 7" an appli-
of their services and to which local consumers can practicably turn for alternatives." 418 U.S. at
619.
68. "[Tlhe Government asserts that the State is an economically differentiated region, because
its boundaries delineate an area within which Washington banks are insulated from most forms of
competition by out-of-state banking organizations." Id. at 620.
69. Id. at 621-23.
70. See Elzinga, supra note 34, at 67; text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
71. Pabst Brewing appeared to struggle with a competition definition, an industry definition
and a regulation definition before abandoning the idea of defining a market. See 384 U.S. at
549-53. Arguably, every case which found a national market employed a regulation definition In
tandem with at least one other test.
72. For example, the unique regulatory power of states over products such as alcohol and
services such as banking or insurance could require different market tests. See note 68 supra.
73. 1974 Trade Cas. 75,003 (D. Del.).
74. British Oxygen Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 20,746 (FTC 1974).
75. The opinion simply speaks in terms of a lessening of competition "in the United States."
TA
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cation to this case of the tests sketched above suggests that all three were
employed in the decision. For purposes of illustration, the reader is referred to
the accompanying chart.
FTC v. British Oxygen Co.: The Government's Case
AIRCO, INC.
(New Jersey Corporation)
1972 Sales: $492 Million
BRITISH OXYGEN COMP.4NY
(United Kingdom Corporation)
1972 Sales: $606 Million
Market Positions: Industrial Gas (by 1972 Sales)
1. WORLDWIDE:
Airco: Third Largest; no
operations outside
United States
2. UNITED KINGDOM:
Airco: No Operations
3. UNITED STATES:
Airco: Second Largest
(17% of market)
Market Positions: Medical Equipment (by 1972 Sales)
1. UNITED KINGDOM:
Airco: No Operations
2. UNITED STATES SUBMARKETS:
a) Inhalation Anesthetic Submarket:
Airco: Largest (35%)
b) Inhalation Therapy Equipment Submarket:
Airco: Second Largest (11%)
c) Medical Pipeline Systems:
Airco: Largest (50%)
BOC: Second Largest;
operations in
nineteen nations
BOC: Largest
BOC: No Operations
BOC: Largest
BOC: 8% (through
U.S. subsidiaries)
BOC: No Operations
BOC: No Operations
(except domestic
paper ,ubsidiary)
Source: FTC Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, FtC v.
British Oxygen Co., 1974 Trade Cas. 75,003 (D. Del.).
Under the Tampa test, it is apparent that only the aspect of foreclosure of
actual competition was reached, and only in the inhalation anesthetic
submarket. In that both parties were present only in that product market,
that was the only market in which buyers could look to alternate means of
supply. BOC's acquisition of Airco's 35 percent share, added to its own 8
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percent, would certainly have entrenched Airco's leading position. However,
under Tampa, the fact that worldwide BOC held the second market position
in industrial gas would not have been at all relevant to the issue of concen-
tration in the domestic market, because there was no showing that United
States purchasers looked abroad to buy industrial gas. 76 Clearly, then, the
competition definition has little place in an international potential competition
case; if the buyers do not rely on the foreign entrant for products, its strong
position in totally foreign markets has little or no relevance.
The industry focus in Pabst goes much further to explain the result in
British Oxygen. By looking to the industry (industrial gas) rather than to the
geographic market (domestic), national lines are more easily crossed and two
levels of increased concentration are identified. First, the acquisition of Airco
would have resulted in entrenchment; Airco would have been supported with
all of BOC's resources. Further, if the "edge effect" test is applied, BOC
would be eliminated as a likely entrant into the domestic industry. However,
the difficulty with this approach is that the decision in the case may have been
based also on a market definition which was global, or at least transnational.
In its brief to the district court, the FTC made much of BOC's worldwide
position and its dominant stance in Britain and the EEC, and raised the
spectre of BOC becoming the largest in its field worldwide. 77 No considera-
tion was given to the questions of whether and why these were relevant
considerations.
There appeared to be adequate domestic market reasons to enjoin the
acquisition under Pabst. However, the Pabst approach can lead a court to
assess transnational concentration, without consideration of the problematic
question of whether the effects doctrine goes so far as to protect foreign
competitors not before the court.7 8 Certainly, the transnational industry focus
illustrates that the BOC acquisition would have concentrated foreign markets,
but is such a consideration relevant to a domestic merger?
A regulation definition of relevant market was not apparent on the face of
British Oxygen, but the case illustrates that in the transnational acquisition, a
76. In its brief to the district court, the FTC stated that "Airco and BOC market their
inhalation anesthetic equipment and inhalation therapy equipment through distributors on a
nationwide basis; Airco also markets its industrial gases and medical pipeline systems nationwide.
Thus an appropriate geographic market is the United States as a whole." FTC Memorandum in
Support of Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 26, FTC
v. British Oxygen Co., 1974 Trade Cas. 75,003 (D. Del.). This statement represented the full
extent of the FTC's market analysis.
77. Id. at 32. In the words of a BOC memo, the Airco acquisition" 'would create indisputably.
the world no. I force in gas and gear-sales of 340 million pounds.... Not that a great many tangible
economies of integration are to be achieved, rather a matter of international muscle commercially
and technologically.' " Id.
78. See FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927) (whether the protection of foreign
competitors of the defendant is within the scope of the FTC's authority). In the lower court, the
decision stated, "we are of opinion that the Commission, if it deemed its action for the public
interest, could promote the interests of foreign raw film makers, as has been done. The
Commission's field of action is foreign as well as interstate commerce." Eastman Kodak Co. v.
FTC, 7 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1925), aff'd on other grounds, 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
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finding that a national market exists no longer means that the largest market
has been found. Rather, in the case of a foreign entrant, the casual designation
of the United States as a relevant market appears to be a regulation
definition-a jurisdictional boundary. 79 There was evidence in British Oxy-
gen that BOC had both operations and further ambitions in Canada. 80
However, no consideration was given to the fact that Canada might be part of
the relevant geographic market, particularly under the Tampa or Pabst
approach. Although under the competition or industry definitions of market,
limiting one's analysis to areas within national boundaries may not be proper,
such an outer limit may be justified. The United States can impose different
tariffs and taxes on foreign firms, as well as limit and regulate their operations
and holdings.81 Thus, the nation may be appropriately considered the rele-
vant market because the transaction of business across national lines may
present severe difficulties. These factors are inextricably intertwined with the
barriers to entry analysis.
There may be a more fundamental reason why market definitions should
stop at national lines. The language of section seven can be read to apply only
to foreclosures of competition in this country; -8 2 concern over transnational
concentration may be beyond the mandate of Congress. However, at least one
court has intimated otherwise.8 3
Market definition in the case of the foreign potential entrant thus appears to
be a mixture of the Pabst industry focus and the regulation definition. The
Tampa test is applicable only where actual transnational competition is
present. This is not the ordinary case. The problem with using Pabst is that
courts must be very careful to distinguish between domestic and foreign
industries. Further, Pabst is an overly vague standard, one which has been
criticized as both economically faulty84 and inconsonant with congressional
intent. The problem with the regulation definition is that its ramifications
have not been thoroughly considered, and it has been rejected by the one
Supreme Court case in which it was offered--Marine Bancorporation.85
However, the odd marriage between these two tests appears to be the only
way, though perhaps an unsatisfactory one, 86 to define a market in the
79. "Jurisdictional" here does not mean the outer limits of the authority of a federal court, but
rather the geographical boundaries of a nation or state.
80. FTC Memorandum in Support of Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction at 30-31, FTC v. British Oxygen Co., 1974 Trade Cas. 75,00 (D. Del.).
81. See generally Elmer & Johnson, supra note 5; Elzinga, supra note 34, at 67; Young, supra
note 8. See Pt. IV infra.
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970) ("any section of the country"); Jacobs, Acquisitions, 43
Antitrust L.J. 552, 558-59 (1975).
83. See note 78 supra.
84. See note 58 supra.
85. 418 U.S. 602, 620-22 (1974); see note 62 supra. However, the Pabst decision appeared to
suggest that in light of the state power over liquor under U.S. ConsL amend. XXI, Wisconsin
was a separate market. See 384 U.S. 546, 560 (Harlan, J., concurring).
86. An economically rational way may not exist. Professor Posner has advised the aban-
donment of the potential competition doctrine, solely on the basis of the concept's domestic
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transnational potential competition case. Because geographic definitions are
fundamental to anti-merger decisions, this unfortunate state of affairs raises
questions about the ultimate utility of the mechanism in this context.
IV. BARRIERS TO ENTRY
A. Conditions in the Target Market
Most mergers challenged by the enforcement agencies as violative of section
seven have occurred in or resulted in entries into markets characterized as
oligopolies. Because oligopolies are not subject to direct attack under the
antitrust laws, the Clayton Act has emerged as a tool to prevent further
concentration which, it has long been presumed, is anticompetitive. 87 In
Philadelphia National Bank, Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, opined
that the one elemental proposition accepted by economists was that a large
number of competitors is desirable while a small number is anticompetitive. 88
While this position frequently has been challenged, it remains the core of the
antimerger law, in that the prevention of concentration appears to be what
Congress intended. 89
With concentration as the key indicator, relevant markets have been
characterized as atomized, loose oligopolies, or tight oligopolies. As the
market grows more concentrated, market shares of the remaining firms rise,
smaller competitors are forced out of business, and entry barriers increase,
Eventually, a point is reached where the remaining firms, because of their
powerful stature, begin to control some of the conditions in the market
without resort to outright conspiracy reachable under the Sherman Act. 90
experience, since "[tihere is no judicially workable method of ranking, even crudely, the poten-
tial competitors in a market .... " Posner, supra note 16, at 323.
87. See notes 21 & 56 supra.
88. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). This proposition was
cited in support of the majority opinion's statement that a prima facie case of a section seven
violation could be shown by (1) an "undue" percentage of market share in the post-merger firm
and (2) a significant increase in concentration. Id.
89. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-78 (1966). " 'The dominant theme
pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered
to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.' " Id. at 276, quoting
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962). But see United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020, 1022-23 (D.R.I. 1974) (no necessary relation between
concentration and competition in the New England beer market; economist suggests that issues
such as pricing behavior, innovation, market shares and product quality are superior indicators).
90. One of the mysteries of the potential competition doctrine is how oligopolists manage to
control market conditions without price-fixing conspiracies or at least "conscious parallelism."
There is a limit to the latter doctrine; see Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) ("Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may
have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious
parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely." (footnote omitted)).
However, manufacturers' business reasons for offering their products for the same price per unit
or quantity are not of themselves evidence of independent pricing sufficient to negate the
inference of a conspiracy; such a result would completely frustrate enforcement of section one of
the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Advertising Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. FTC, 238 F.2d 108 (1st Cir.
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Thus, when this line into oligopoly is crossed, the remaining firms can
maximize profits by raising prices to reap monopoly profits, or by controlling
supply to their own advantage. The net effect on the market is presumed to
be similar to that caused by a full monopoly.
Mergers which result in firms obtaining dominant positions, or which "tend
to create a monopoly," are violative of the Clayton Act.9 1 However, the
potential competition doctrine bars mergers which do none of these things.
The Supreme Court has accepted the proposition that a
merger may be unlawful if the target market is substantially concentrated, if the
acquiring firm has the characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to render it
a perceived potential de novo entrant, and if the acquiring firm's premerger presence
on the fringe of the target market in fact tempered oligopolistic behavior on the part of
existing participants in that market. 92
This is what has been referred to as actual potential competition. The
companion doctrine-future potential competition-has not been explicitly
accepted by the Supreme Court.93 That doctrine involves no edge effect;
rather under that doctrine section seven encourages de novo or toehold entry,
in contrast to a large acquisition, as procompetitive. The most difficult
question posed by the doctrine of future potential competition is whether a
present merger which is not anticompetitive can be barred because otherwise
the entrant might someday enter in a theoretically more salutary fashion. 94
Edge effect is usually expected to be evidenced by limit-pricing. Falstaff
appeared to assume that the oligopolist will limit-price in the face of a
perceived potential entrant; this assumption has been criticized as unrealis-
tic.9 5 However, the Marine Bancorporation96 test does not appear to require
limit-pricing per se. Instead, that opinion took refuge in a vague presumption
that some sort of edge effect would occur and that the effect would temper the
oligopolists' avarice.
Actual potential competition analysis operates best in the case of a geo-
1956). See generally Markham, The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership, 14 Am. Econ.
Rev. 891 (1951); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 658-66 (1962).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967);
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1322-23
(1965).
92. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1974).
93. Id. at 639; accord, United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973).
94. "We leave for another day the question of the applicability of § 7 to a merger that will
leave competition in the marketplace exactly as it was, neither hurt nor helped, and that is
challengeable under § 7 only on grounds that the company could, but did not, enter de novo or
through 'toe-hold' acquisition and that there is less competition than there would have been had
entry been in such a manner." United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973)
(emphasis omitted). Ten years ago Professor Turner came to the conclusion that section 7 does
indeed compel the most procompetitive route. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1379-80 (1965).
95. Note, Falstaff, supra note 4, at 848-53.
96. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
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graphic extension merger. Whether the doctrine can operate rationally in the
product extension or conglomerate situation is questionable. 97 In all cases,
however, the analysis must look closely at barriers to the entrant. In the
transnational case this inquiry is immensely complicated. In addition, recent
Supreme Court opinions appear to recognize the operation of a wider scope of
barriers, both legal and economic. 98
B. Legal Barriers
In the operation of the potential competition doctrine, an acquiring party
can be adjudged a probable entrant only if a barrier is not a complete bar.99
Total legal blockades will operate completely to foreclose any entry, at least
until the laws are changed. For instance, the state-by-state regulation of the
banking industry usually will totally bar interstate bank mergers, at least in
the case of a domestically chartered institution. However, most legal barriers
are not of this extreme nature; rather, they are obstacles which can be
overcome.
All acquiring firms, be they domestic or foreign, face a series of collateral
federal legal obstacles to mergers. If the acquisition is effected by tender offer,
the firm must satisfy the federal securities laws, which require, inter alia,
laborious registration for the issuance of stock °0 0 (in the exchange offer) and
notification of acquisition or intention to acquire five percent or more of the
stock of any corporation.10' In addition, the entrant will find regulations on
the amount of credit he can obtain or extend in financing large stock
transactions.' 0 2 These regulations, affecting every tender offer takeover, are
97. "It would be more difficult in a product-extension merger case to determine on the basis of
objective evidence alone which of several alternative courses of expansion the potential entrant
was most likely to pursue." Note, Falstaff, supra note 4, at 856 (footnote omitted). The most
recent case in this area resulted in a strong rebuff to the operation of potential competition in
conglomerate mergers. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). However, the FTC subsequently issued a proposed complaint
attacking the merger. 3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 20,745 (No. 741 0620, filed Oct. 31, 1974).
98. "[Cjourts must take into account the extensive federal and state regulation of banks,
particularly the legal restraints on entry unique to this line of commerce." United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 606 (1974). "The Court lays itself open for arguments that
economic, as well as legal, barriers exist for new competitors." Id. at 654 n.5 (White, J.,
dissenting).
99. See Note, Falstaff, supra note 4, at 846-48.
100. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). See Wheat & Blackstone, Guideposts
for a First Public Offering, 15 Bus. Law. 539, 556-58 (1960) (model registration process taking at
least three months).
101. Williams Act § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970), which makes unlawful tender of-
fers for more than 5% of any class of equity security without specified disclosures to target
shareholders and to the SEC. The Williams Act has been invoked in tandem with section 7
of the Clayton Act in a number of private cases. See, e.g., Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill,
Inc., 498 F. 2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp.,
366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973). On the requirements of the Williams Act generally, see Note, A
Proposal for Affirmative Disclosure by Target Management During Tender Offers, 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 190, 192-202 (1975).
102. Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970), which gives
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designed to effectuate the chief objective of the securities laws: full disclosure
of the character and purpose of the firm's activities. 0 3 While such legal
restraints do not necessarily differ in varying relevant markets, their effect is
different when the acquiring firm is foreign rather than domestic.
Almost all securities regulation requires detailed financial reporting of the
firm's operations. False or misleading financial statements can expose the
issuer to a hornet's nest of liability' 0 4 to purchasers and investors, and can
result in criminal proceedings. Certainly, for these reasons any corporation
with a shaky financial or legal foundation may avoid tender offers altogether.
In the case of a foreign issuer, the problems of accurate accounting are much
greater; overseas accounting practices and principles vary greatly, even within
the European Economic Community.10 5 The foreign firm may face the
significant expense of converting its entire financial reporting system to
correspond with domestic systems familiar to the American investor, whom
the securities laws were designed to protect. In addition, the SEC issuance
and continuous disclosure reporting forms for large foreign corporations engaged
in domestic stock transactions are particularly onerous. '0 6 Direct tender offers
present a spate of additional problems for the foreign entrant, as the tortuous
securities litigation in the Liquifin AG acquisition of Ronson Corporation has
demonstrated. 10 7 Clearly, the securities regulations are more difficult for the
the Federal Reserve Board power to regulate the credit available in exchanges for the purchase or
carrying of securities. FRB Regulations T, G, U, and X (12 C.F.R. §§ 207, 220, 221, 224 (1974))
require that for certain transactions to be lawful, sufficient collateral must be presented within a
specified period. See Comment, Civil Liability for Margin Violations-The Effect of Section 7(f)
and Regulation X, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 93 (1974); Note, Regulation X: A Complexis, 50 Notre
Dame Law. 136 (1974).
103. The announced purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 was to "provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." Securities Act of 1933, ch.
38, 48 StaL 74 (Preamble).
104. E.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11-13, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-m, 77o (1970); Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (Weinstein, J.). Liability in
hostile tender offers can result from a myriad of problems. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v.
Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (violations of both
Rule 10b-5 and proxy regulations).
105. Young, supra note 8, at 118. Not only the issuer, but the accountant as well may be held
liable. See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 909
(1975) (applying a negligence standard).
106. Young, supra note 8, at 117. This factor alone leads foreign firms to set up domestic
subsidiaries. Id. See text accompanying note 114 infra.
107. Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin AG, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973), remanded, 370 F.
Supp. 597 (D.N.J.) (remand), aft'd, 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974).
Additional problems are presented by SEC notification requirements contained in Sched. 13d, 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-I01 (1974). It has been held that both 13d and tender offer documents must
disclose certain possible antitrust liabilities. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973). The SEC is considering tightening these requirements.
E.g., SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 11003 (Sept. 9, 1974), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 79,956. See generaliyAxinn, Techniquesand Antitrust Aspects Concerning Foreign Entry,
43 Fordham L. Rev. 741 (1975).
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foreign firm if only because domestic companies are already accustomed to
operating under such laws.
These considerations and others of equal import-specifically taxes-have
led to the situation where foreign firms have taken alternate routes to achieve
takeovers. 108 For example, many firms will attempt to borrow huge sums of
cash to buy corporations, thus avoiding the problems of stock issuance. This
route is not a total solution, however; a number of the same securities laws,
including the Williams Act, and proxy regulations, come into play in this
situation also. 10 9 In addition, foreign states are concerned with cash flow, and
may place their own legal obstacles in the way of a firm borrowing hundreds
of millions of marks or pounds to spend in the United States. On the other
hand, if the loan is obtained in this country, the foreign entrant may face
complex and discriminatory regulations of the Federal Reserve Board, aimed
at controlling the flow of funds to foreign interests. While recently most of
these monetary restrictions have been eliminated, 110 there is no reason why
new ones could not be imposed; not even an act of Congress would be
necessary.
Tax problems can be significant. Not only do foreign tax laws operate to
produce different and often conflicting business considerations, but inter-
national tax treaties serve to complicate the issues further. "'1 For instance, a
domestic firm engaged in a joint venture with a foreign entrant may desire a
high percentage of voting control in order to reap the tax benefits of
consolidation. Its foreign partner may similarly desire a significant voting
interest in order to take advantage of its nation's laws, which encourage
major parficipation in overseas ventures. In addition, if the foreign firm
engaged in a tender offer is presently immune from federal income taxes, then
that firm will lose the concomitant benefits of domestic tax deductions for the
expenses incurred in the acquisition. 112 Further, the Internal Revenue Service
must specifically approve acquisitions achieved by stock-for-stock reorgani-
zations; once again, the treatment of foreign firms differs from that accorded
to domestic corporations.'13
108. The cash tender offer has been referred to as the most frequent mode of foreign tender
offers. See Young, supra note 8, at 119 n.47.
109. See note 104 supra.
110. In the 1960's major restrictions existed on stock and bond issues by foreign corporations,
as well as on credit lines which banks could extend to foreign interests. These Federal Reserve
Board regulations were imposed to stabilize the U.S. balance of payments. In January of 1974,
President Nixon eliminated most of the restrictions, but minor regulations remain, such as tie
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act. See Elmer & Johnson, supra note 5, at 685-86.
111. These tax problems vary from nation to nation; the United States has entered into a
series of widely differing tax treaties. Compare, e.g., Treaty with United Kingdom on Double
Taxation of Income, April 16, 1945, art. III, 60 Stat. 1377, T.I.A.S. 1546, as amended, Mar. 17,
1966, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 1254, T.I.A.S. 6089, with Treaty with France on Income & Property
Taxes, July 28, 1967, art. 6, [1968] 4 U.S.T. 5281, T.I.A.S. 6518. See 1 & 2 CCH Tax
Treaties 2809 (France), 8108 (United Kingdom).
112. Young, supra note 8, at 122.
113. Before a foreign corporation can work a tax-free exchange offer, it must, in addition to
meeting the requirements placed on domestic corporations, establish "to the satisfaction of the
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The upshot of these collateral federal legal restraints is significant. One
securities law commentator concluded that it is highly advisable for foreign
firms to establish domestic subsidiaries-under the liberal corporate laws of a
state such as Delaware-to serve solely as the acquisition vehicle of the parent
firm.1 4 Indeed, just this route was chosen by British Oxygen to facilitate its
Airco acquisition. 115 The emerging prevalence of these paper companies
serves to complicate the toehold analysis of a future potential competition
case, as discussed in Part V.
The foreign firm also must consider the legal restraints of the several states.
Presently, eleven states-including Nevada, Ohio, Virginia and Wisconsin-
have special statutes regulating corporate takeovers."16 Again, the domestic
firm has the advantages of familiarity with relevant laws. At the very least,
the existence of such state laws will mean more filings and greater re-
quirements of disclosure.117 The foreign entrant also may face archaic and
discriminatory state laws which limit the amount of control which a foreign
firm may exercise over a state corporation.' 8 While such state laws probably
are unconstitutional under the supremacy clause-because they are incon-
sistent with treaties' 9--or under the commerce clause-because they infringe
upon Congress' plenary authority-the issues well may have to be litigated.
This was the case in Texasguif, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp., 120 where
the Texas firm, hostile to the takeover, raised state laws which, it argued,
banned the takeover. While the Canadian corporation presented well-founded
arguments as to these statutes' unconstitutionality, and the trial judge ruled
the law inapplicable, the case demonstrates the existence of hidden and
unexpected state legal restraints. One English practitioner has referred to such
obstacles as "booby traps."121
Secretary or his delegate that such exchange is not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its
principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income taxes." Int Rev. Code of 1954, § 367(a).
114. Young, supra note 8, at 117. See text accompanying notes 171-74 infra.
115. See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
116. Workshop 1k Mergers--Foreign and Domestic Take-Overs, 43 Antitrust L.J. 157,
161-62 (1975) (remarks of Mr. Robinson); N.Y. Times, Oct- 21, 1975, at 53, col. 1.
117. Young, supra note 8, at 121. State regulation can be dispositive in areas such as banking
and insurance. One commentator concludes that federal and state regulation of foreign banking
constitutes discrimination. Edwards, Regulation of Foreign Banking in the United States:
International Reciprocity and Federal-State Conflicts, 13 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 239, 268 (1974).
118. E.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1527 (1962), which applies to international trading
corporations. "A majority of the stock shall in all instances be owned by citizens of the United
States, and a majority of the officers and directors thereof shall in all instances be citizens of the
United States. .. and of this State." Id. Violation can resultin forfeiture of the corporate charter. The
New York Business Corporation Law reveals no such restrictions. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
§§ 1301, 1303 (McKinney 1963).
119. The issues presented by international treaties, particularly tax agreements, are beyond
the scope of this Comment. See note 111 supra. However, as long as the state statute attempts to
so regulate businesses engaged in interstate commerce, it is subject to attack under the supremacy
clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. Even if interstate commerce is not involved, violations of the due
process and equal protection clauses may be present.
120. 366 F. Supp. 374, 410-15 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
121. Foreign Entry into the United States-Panel Discussion, 43 Fordham L Rev. 756 (1975)
(remarks of Mr. Lever).
1975]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
Beyond securities and tax laws, there are a series of federal statutes which
limit certain activities to, and provide certain federal programs for, corpo-
rations substantially owned or controlled by United States' interests. Most of
these are limited to specific industries, but others, such as the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),122 apply to any business operating
abroad. Under the OPIC Act the federal government insures United States'
corporations against foreign expropriation or revolution. Since participating
companies must be substantially owned by United States citizens, a domestic
multinational corporation may have a great advantage over a foreign mul-
tinational entrant.
In industries which bring into play considerations of national security or
public policy, foreign corporations may be totally banned. While these
restraints have been discussed elsewhere,' 23 they include (1) defense related
industries-foreign controlled firms may be barred from access to classified
plans;124 (2) maritime trade-where the lucrative "coastwise trade" is limited
to firms 75% of which must be owned by Americans; 125 (3) the broadcasting
and common carrier communications industry-where the FCC is prohibited
by statute from granting licenses to firms under full foreign control; 12 6 (4) air
commerce-where Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) approval of mergers is
required and where foreign control is limited to 25%;127 and (5) atomic
power-where licenses may not be issued to corporations under alien con-
trol. 128
122. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191 et seq. (1970). "Eligible investors" are defined as "corporations,
partnerships, or other associations including nonprofit associations, created under the laws of the
United States or any State or territory thereof and substantially beneficially owned by United
States citizens." Id. § 2198(c)(2).
123. These federal statutes have been discussed in Elmer & Johnson, supra note 5, at 684-85.
124. See Grombach v. Oerlikon Tool & Arms Corp. of America, 276 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1960)
(Swiss firm, manufacturing weapons in U.S. for export, was required to have security clearance;
at least 75% of the stock had to be American owned).
125. The Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. (1970). Section 802(a) provides In
part that "in the case of a corporation, association, or partnership operating any vessel in the
coastwise trade the amount of interest required to be owned by citizens of the United States shall
be 75 per centum." Coastwise trade encompasses commerce between any two U.S. ports. See
Central Vermont Transp. Co. v. Durning, 294 U.S. 33, 38 (1935). Passenger carriage is equally
restricted; see Elmer & Johnson, supra note 5, at 689-91.
126. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). Thus, for example, the
FCC may not grant station licenses to, inter alia, "[any corporation of which any officer or
director is an alien or of which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned of record or voted
by aliens or their representatives or by a foreign government or representative thereof, or by any
corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country." Id. § 310(a)(4). The Commissioner
has broad discretion to refuse to issue a license even if the requirements of the statute are met. Id.
§ 310(a)(5). The Act also contains a series of other restrictions on foreign participation, and all
consolidations or mergers of telegraph carriers involving more than 20% foreign ownership of the
resulting firm are barred; id. § 222(d). FCC approval of all other telegraph carrier mergers is
required. Id. § 222(b), (c).
127. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970). The CAB must approve
of all mergers. Id. § 1378. Two-thirds of the directors of the corporations must be United States
citizens, and 75% of voting control must be in domestic hands. Id. § 1301(13).
128. "No license may be issued to an alien or any any [sic] corporation or other entity if the
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On a second level, other federal laws place conditions on foreign interests.
Mineral extraction is regulated on a reciprocal basis; the United States will
place the same restrictions on foreign firms as that firm's nation places on
United States firms.1 29 In a few areas, such as banking and oil, foreign firms
can participate only if they first incorporate domestic subsidiaries for that
purpose. 130 This, of course, makes the foreign interest effectively subject to
suit, taxes, and regulation.
The above listings are by no means exhaustive; in regard to state laws, they
are merely illustrative. Even if the restraints do not all rise to the level of
antitrust considerations, the degree of foreign control may well have to be
disclosed under the Williams Act.1 3' A court sitting in a merger case can
usually rely upon the parties to alert it to the relevant collateral legal
restraints; but how these laws fit into the barriers to entry analysis has not yet
been suggested.
Clearly there is no need for any extended analysis regarding the status of
these laws as initial barriers. In many cases the statutes will totally bar the
foreign firm; in others there are ways around the statutes.t 32 Sometimes the
laws prohibit only voting control; the foreign firm can thus buy a debt
participation or preferred stock. 133 However, this route has two liabilities.
Commission knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a
foreign corporation, or a foreign government." Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d)
(1970).
129. Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1970). Section 181 provides in part:
"Citizens of another country, the laws, customs, or regulations of which deny similar or like
privileges to citizens or corporations of this country, shall not by stock ownership, stock holding,
or stock control, own any interest in any lease acquired under the provisions of this chapter."
These provisions could cause trouble in transactions with Canada, Canada still seeks to attract
foreign investment, but requires that such investment "significantly benefit" Canada. See
Bergsten, Coming Investment Wars?, 53 Foreign Affairs 135 (Oct. 1974).
130. Banking, ownership of land, and drilling for oil are all possible with domestic incor-
poration. See Elmer & Johnson, supra note 5, at 694-97. With regard to banks, the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841 et seq. (1970), is specifically applicable. See text
accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
131. See Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 420-31 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
(violations of Clayton Act too unlikely to require disclosure, but applicable statutes restricting
foreign operation must be disclosed). See notes 101 & 107 supra.
132. A business law commentator concluded that "at least for the present, neither statutes nor
red tape pose significant barriers to the acquisition of control of most American corporations by
foreign interests." Elmer & Johnson, supra note 5, at 698. However, the same author notes that
the restrictive industry statutes place "serious limitations on the degree of day-to-day control such
an alien interest could exercise." Id. at 691. De novo entry, of course, is more difficult. Presently,
there appears to be a split of opinion on the extent of that difficulty. See text accompanying notes
170-74 infra.
133. Debt participation can take any number of forms, including preferred stock, bonds, and
debentures. See generally H. Henn, Corporations §§ 154-56 (2d ed. 1970). With express statutory
authority, common in many states, holders of debt securities may be granted voting powers; see
Tracy, The Problem of Granting Voting Rights to Bondholders, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 208 (1935).
However, even debt interests may be barred in order to stabilize the U.S. balance of payments.
See 31 U.S.C. § 931 (1970) (President charged by Congress with the responsibility to "undertake
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First, the foreign entrant will not achieve its goal of acquisition and control;
instead, it must remain a silent partner. Second, most of the statutes are
vaguely worded. It is unclear whether control alone is barred, or whether
significant interests are also prohibited. 134 Since many of these statutes have
not been construed, again the foreign firm may have to face litigation.
A more troublesome question is how these laws will operate as indirect
barriers, specifically to restrain diversification of the foreign firm once it has
entered the market. For instance, a foreign entrant may be able to enter the
domestic oil market merely by domestic incorporation. But if the oligopolists
in the domestic oil industry plan diversifications into atomic energy, the
foreigner effectively may be barred from such ventures. Or, if the oil firms
desire forward integration, and thus build and operate tanker fleets,13S
domestic rivals will have significant advantages, both in subsidizing con-
struction and in coastline trade. The continuing trend towards diversification
across industry lines demonstrates that the foreign interest may be placed at
a serious competitive disadvantage. While the courts have not yet considered
diversification potential as part of the barriers to entry analysis, Marine
Bancorporation indicated that in unique industries the Supreme Court will
look more closely at how the putative entrant would fare in the market. 1 36
This assessment of legal barriers should not ignore the fact that a foreign
entrant may gain legal benefits from its transnational stance during the
takeover. Because the firm is located elsewhere, it need only insure that its
domestic operations comply with domestic laws. As noted above, foreign
firms are, to a great extent, exempt from federal income taxes. In addition,
the policy position of the enforcement agencies still is to encourage foreign
investment. 137
continuous surveillance over the private flow of dollar funds from the United States to foreign
countries .... .'). See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
134. Most of the statutes discussed refer to "stock" and thus to voting control; however, a
number speak in terms of "interest" which arguably could include debt participation. See notes
124-29 supra; Elmer & Johnson, supra note 5, at 684-85.
135. This is what the OPEC states have been doing; however, OPEC has been buying
rather than assembling tankers. See Robards, The Oil Powers Assemble a Tanker Fleet, N.Y.
Times, March 23, 1975, § 3 (Business and Finance) at 1, col. 1.
136. Referring in his dissent to the majority opinion, Justice White stated that the decision
"erects formidable barriers to the application of the potential-competition doctrine not only in the
banking business but in other lines of commerce.... The courts must also examine conditions in
the market and conclude for themselves that there is a realistic expectation that the new entrant
will appropriate for itself a substantial part of the business of the major competitors in the
market." United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 654 (1974) (White, J.,
dissenting). "[Tihere are unmistakable signs that the Court's general approach to section 7 is
undergoing a significant transformation." Robinson, supra note 2, at 246.
137. At present, the position of the Justice Department is to give equal treatment to foreign
and domestic mergers. Address by K.I. Clearwaters, Special Ass't to the Ass't Attorney General
in charge of the Antitrust Division, to the Ass'n of General Counsel, May 4, 1973, in 5 CCH
Trade Reg. Rep. 50,169, at 55,302-03 (1973). The official position as regards foreign entry was
recently restated by Mr. Davidow, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section: "I think we certainly
intend, for the foreseeable future, to continue to view any demands for anti-foreign enforcement,
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The Texasgulfr 38 decision illustrated many of these advantages. In that case
a domestic minerals firm failed to obtain an injunction to halt a lightning cash
tender offer takeover by the Canada Development Corporation (CDC). CDC
was chartered by the Canadian Government, inter alia, to acquire companies
engaged in the exploitation of Canadian resources. The announced goal was
to preserve the benefits of Canadian resources for Canadian citizens.139 CDC
thus operated as a closed-end investment trust. In the case of the Texasgulf
takeover, CDC was able to obtain a 235 million dollar credit line from its
government and from Canadian banks.140 In the United States District Court,
Texasgulf charged that, in order to keep down the price at which it could
acquire control, CDC conspired to violate the Williams Act. In fact, CDC did
conceal the early participation of a private Canadian firm, Noranda Mines, in
the first stages of the takeover. Noranda itself held shares of Texasgulf and
acted as agent for CDC in the initial stock purchases. Further, even after
Noranda pulled out of the contemplated joint acquisition, it attempted to
obtain a shareholder list of Texasgulf. Brushing aside evidence of a series of
interactions between CDC and Noranda regarding Texasgulf, the district
court held that Texasgulf was not entitled to an injunction because it had
failed to prove a conspiracy. Further, the court concluded that the CDC
tender offer and 13d schedule were "lawful when made;" neither the offer nor
the schedule made any mention of Noranda's participation.' 4"
The proposition that emerged was that a foreign interest-particularly a
foreign public interest such as CDC-can tailor its United States activities to
United States law while apparently engaging in acts overseas which it could
not do in the United States with equal impunity. Significantly the refusal of
the court in Texasgulf to enjoin the takeover was not for want of jurisdiction,
but rather, was due to a failure of the court to scrutinize closely the events
which took place in the offices of the Canadian concerns. Considering that
takeovers are often campaigns on many fronts, this partial immunity for acts
outside the United States can be a distinct advantage for the foreign entrant.
Texasguif also raises the thorny issue of a foreign state as entrant. While
CDC is not exactly the alter ego of the Canadian government, it did operate
to achieve a specific governmental policy. Foreign states have never been
subject to United States antitrust laws, since they are immunized by the act
of state doctrine. 14 2 Foreign states must comply with the securities laws if
or legislation, with a very critical eye." Foreign Entry into the United States-Panel Discussion,
43 Fordham L. Rev. 756, 758 (1975) (remarks of Air. Davidow).
138. 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
139. Id. at 383-84.
140. CDC, a government corporation which will sell 90% of its shares to Canadians at some
future date, obtained 75 million dollars from the Canadian Government and 160 million from
Canadian banking institutions. Id. at 383, 400. CDC is presently engaged in preparing its first
public issue to Canadian citizens. See Toronto Globe and Iail, July 30, 1975 at BS, col. S.
141. 366 F. Supp. at 391-95, 397-400, 431-32; see notes 101 and 107 supra.
142. The act of state doctrine has been excluded from consideration in this Comment in that
the cases and examples discussed, with the exception of Texasgulf, involve private parties. With
regard to the problems presented by the doctrine, see generally Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and
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they are to sell stock here,' 4 3 and there is no doubt that it was within the
power of the district court to enjoin the CDC tender offer. Because of the
result in Texasguif, the court was not faced with the more difficult question of
whether a federal judge can order a foreign state to divest a domestic
acquisition. 144
C. Economic Barriers
One commentator has suggested that there are in fact two types of
economic barriers to entry, time-lag barriers and "true" economic barriers. 145
This distinction is useful in evaluating the situation of the foreign entrant.
Time barriers assess the period during which the entrant may face sig-
nificant losses or be compelled to make alternate arrangements before its
facilities in the new market are fully operational. ' 46 Thus, if an oil company
undertakes a de novo market extension to achieve full national status, it may,
for example, purchase a distribution system and crude oil reserves. However,
to fully enter a new gasoline market, the entrant will have to wait a period of
up to five years before refinery construction is completed. During that five
years the new competitor must keep the distribution system going, and will
desire to switch over to nationwide advertising, with its attendant economies
of scale. Because a significant period of time must pass before the firm can sell
its own refined gas, the entrant must find a supply of exchange gas and swap
its crude oil for finished product until plants are complete. This de novo
scenario1 4 7 is comparable to those which exist in many other vertically
integrated industries.
The mergers described in United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co. and
Falstaff were undertaken so that the entrant could take advantage of, inter
alia, the economies of national advertising. 148 In each case the defendant was
"going national" by entering one significant market in which it previously had
Foreign Sovereignty, 49 Va. L. Rev. 925 (1963); Reeves, The Foreign Sovereign Before United
States Courts, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 455 (1970).
143. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(2), 77g (1970); see SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benev. Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738
(2d Cir. 1941). With regard to the application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act to foreign private issuers, see Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir., 1975);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
144. Although the court found no antitrust violations, CDC offered to be enjoined from any
such violations, and the court did so. 366 F. Supp. 374, 431 (S.D. Tex. 1973). Under the final
settlement CDC obtained 30% of Texasgulf and one-third membership on the board of directors.
Elmer & Johnson, supra note 5, at 681.
145. Comment, Toehold, supra note 4, at 168.
146. Id. at 168-69. The longer the time-lag for entry, the more likely the oligopolists will raise
prices to make short-run profits, settling for a smaller share of the market when the de novo
entrant arrives. Id.
147. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1248-51 (C.D. Cal.
1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974) (describing the de novo expansion of comparable firms
to conclude that defendant should have done likewise).
148. Id. at 1245-46; United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 529 (1973). The
Supreme Court has always paid great attention to the power and economies of advertising In
consumer goods merger cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 575 (1967).
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not operated. An advantage such as this may offset high entry barriers; a
domestic giant can trade on its near-national reputation to muscle its way into
the new market. 149 However, no such advantage will accrue to a foreign
entrant, unless that competitor enjoys an intenational reputation. In addi-
tion, because the U.S. market is highly sophisticated competitively, foreign
firms have moved more slowly, testing the waters in various submarkets
before deciding to move in on a large scale. This was the plan of action of
British Oxygen Co., which set up a series of domestic subsidiaries before
attempting its takeover of Airco. 150 These economic realities, aggravated by
pure distance as well as by varying cultural and purchasing patterns in the
foreign and the domestic spheres, must not be ignored. Courts should
recognize that it may be much more difficult for a foreign entrant to overcome
the economic disadvantages of time barriers; and that, in order to enter, the
foreign firm must follow a different pattern of behavior.
"True" economic barriers are those actual costs which the entrant, but not
the oligopolists in the market, must incur.' 1s Here too the barriers are higher
for a foreign firm. Market extension mergers are often motivated by the
presence of excess production. 152 That excess can help a new competitor in
overcoming the difficulties of transition. Clearly, it is much easier to ship
excess goods across state lines than it is to ship from overseas. Many imports
face special tariffs. 15 3 In addition, the federal anti-dumping laws recently
have been toughened; these laws prevent a foreign firm from selling its
products in the United States at prices lower than those at which it sells its
products domestically.' 54 Because of these discriminatory laws, a foreign
manufacturer which is expanding into the United States still probably would
dispose of excess production somewhere closer to home. In this area, it is
apparent that a Canadian firm may be able to sell excess production in the
United States, but a British firm is more likely to dispose of excess within the
Common Market.
One economic study has concluded that product extension mergers are often
motivated by the threat of unused resources. Is s Here the domestic rival has a
prime advantage over the foreign entrant for similar reasons as those just
noted. Clearly, vertical integration, forward or reverse, is more easily
achieved within one nation than it is transnationally. Some of the factors
involved are purely the result of accidents of history and geography. The
United States is relatively isolated from other sophisticated nations (excepting
Canada) by the Atlantic and the Pacific. Most nearby nations-those in
149. See Note, Falstaff, supra note 4, at 847.
150. See notes 172-74 infra and accompanying text.
151. Comment, Toehold, supra note 4, at 168.
152. Cf. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020. 1024 (D.R.. 1974).
153. E.g., President Ford's special import fee on foreign crude oil. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1975,
at 1, col. 2; see Elzinga, supra note 34, at 67.
154. Anti-Dumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 160-71 (Supp. 1, 1975), amending 19 U.S.C.
§§ 160-71 (1970). See Fortune, supra note 6, at 175.
155. Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under Section 7: The Supreme Court's Crystal Ball,
1964 Sup. CL Rev. 171, 183 (citing a study by Professor Chandler).
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Central and South America-are underdeveloped and thus are not likely
sources of highpowered competitors. 15 6
Beyond these readily apparent disparities between transnational and
domestic mergers are the vaguer but equally significant problems of consumer
recognition, managerial skill and risk aversion.- 7 A foreign firm's decision to
enter the United States is a significant one; many firms simply do not have the
expertise to break into some of the most sophisticated oligopolies in the world.
In this light the fear of OPEC petrodollars fades; OPEC may vertically
integrate its oil business, but the prospect of any of these countries controlling
and managing domestic firms in unrelated industries is less likely. 18 Instead,
the OPEC states will probably purchase debt interests, and be content to reap
the profits of American efforts.
In other contexts, foreign firms may be unable to withstand the heat of
competition. Thus, in the Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 159
Volkswagen bought Delanair from an English firm, which wanted to get out
of the American automobile airconditioner market not because it was declin-
ing but because it was mushrooming. 160 Clearly the foreign firm doubted its
own ability to keep pace with domestic rivals. In consumer goods industries, a
lack of customer recognition can seriously hamper a foreign entrant. Few
Americans, for instance, are aware of the name "Evian," which is almost
synonymous with its product-bottled water-in France. If Evian and Deer
Park Mountain Spring were rivals moving into a new domestic market where
neither previously had operated, Deer Park would have both the advantages
of consumer recognition and of the significant advertising economies of scale.
Further, even if Americans knew of Evian, prejudices or ethnocentric at-
titudes arguably may affect purchasing patterns.
Finally, the decision of the entrant to move into the United States market
will depend upon its own assessment of how its presence will affect conditions
there and whether it can make a sufficient profit. It is clear that many foreign
businessmen feel ill-equipped to foray into the American economy, for both
business and cultural reasons. 16 1 Whether entry is in truth as difficult as
156. On the relative unimportance of developing nations in the transnation strategy of
multinationals, see Drucker, Multinationals and Developing Countries: Myths and Realities, 53
Foreign Affairs 121 (Oct. 1974).
157. Risk aversion constitutes the degree to which the acquiring firm will be able to withstand
significant economic losses in the initial post-entry period. For example, Phillips was able to
absorb a 100 million dollar loss following its takeover of Tidewater Oil. See United States v.
Phillips Petroleum, 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1241 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
On the need for managerial skill, see Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374,
408 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
158. Fortune, supra note 6, at 172.
159. 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
160. In 1968-69, the U.S. market for quality car airconditioners experienced rapid expansion.
The English firm desired to avoid large-scale participation in American manufacturing. Id. at
612.
161. "I think it would be illusory ... for you to suppose that a lot of foreign businessmen are
going to fall over themselves to start from scratch in this country. Therefore, they may not be the
potential competitors that you perceive them to be unless they are allowed to make some
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believed, the fact that foreigners feel apprehensive about entry is relevant,
since the potential competition doctrine deals with perceptions.
D. Barriers to Entry: The Uses of Precedent
In the previous sections, obstacles to entry have been discussed in their
broadest scope. However, for the practitioner, it is important to consider the
extent to which the precedent of domestic cases will be controlling in a
challenge to foreign entry. Although there have been few cases which have
reached a section seven violation solely on grounds of potential competi-
tion,' 62 those cases do tend to concentrate the analysis in certain areas.
In assessing barriers, the Falstaff decision in the Supreme Court compared
the defendant to its rival competitors, reviewing the history of market shares,
the number of other potential entrants, their geographic location (i.e., how
many were not presently in the relevant market), and the national size of the
defendant and its actual competitors.' 6 3 Phillips Petroleum considered all
these factors, as well as the expansion history of rivals, in order to discover
the "most likely" potential entrant, in terms of financial and managerial
capabilities. 164
It is difficult to see how this comparative analysis can be transplanted intact
into the foreign case. By definition, a foreign entrant does not have a national
size by United States standards; its stature cannot easily be compared to that
of American companies. Courts in foreign acquisition cases will be less able to
rely upon rank: the largest Dutch competitor considered may be insignificant
compared to an American rival ranked 25th here, unless the Dutch firm
happens to be Royal Dutch/Shell. It may well be an exercise in futility to
attempt to "rank" a foreign comglomerate such as the Unilever Group next to
American firms. In assessing barriers, then, federal courts will be forced to
abandon the familiar and convenient yardsticks of rank and market shares
and instead look more closely to pure size; i.e., to factors such as assets, gross
sales, debt/equity ratios, etc. It can be expected that the inapplicability of
traditional tests1 65 will force courts to delve deeply into the character of the
take-over." Foreign Entry into the United States-Panel Discussion, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 756,
757 (1975) (Remarks of Mr. Lever); see Jacobs, Acquisitions, 43 Anti. L.J. 552 (1975).
162. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem.,
418 U.S. 906 (1974), is, in fact, the only case to reach final judgment on this ground. United States
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973), remanded the decision to assess the issue of
potential competition, but the district court on remand found no violation. United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974).
163. 410 U.S. at 527-29.
164. The Phillips decision engaged in a remarkably thorough comparison between the
defendant oil company and its various rivals, assessing past history of expansion, asset levels,
debt/equity ratios, growth rates and profits, as well as national and international stature and
diversification potential of the defendant. 367 F. Supp. at 1229, 1240, 1246-55.
165. E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328-34 (1962) (test for domestic
companies). "Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration
of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must
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firms involved, pursuing complex business analyses in all but the most
obvious cases. It will be to the advantage of a foreign defendant to point out
that its rank in its home nation is not necessarily comparable to ranks in the
United States, that its competitors and other potential entrants may be spread
all over the globe, aid that meaningful comparisons to find the "most likely"
foreign entrant are immensely complicated.
It is also to the advantage of the foreign defendant that the Supreme Court
has refused to adopt the idea of future potential competition 166 and that the
Court has consistently required actual evidence of "edge effect" in present
potential cases. 167 As the previous discussion has indicated, 168 "edge effect" is
certainly less likely to be found in the transnational case, in light of the fact
that excess foreign production cannot easily be utilized; foreign entrants
cannot trade on existing consumer recognition to "go national" and, most
essentially, in most areas purchasers of goods and services simply do not "go
window shopping" on an international scale.
If no transnational edge effect is found, the courts should hesitate to switch
to the toehold analysis, which is properly part of only future potential
cases; 169 and the concept has not been accepted in domestic situations by any
means. In the foreign context, it is vital to distinguish entry into a market by
small acquisition (toehold) from entry into a country by small incorporation.
It has been intimated by some practitioners that larger toeholds should be
afforded the foreign entrant. 70 There is support for this position in the
significant evidence, much of it discussed above, that the unique barriers
facing a foreign firm militate against de novo entry in most cases. However, it
is here suggested that the foreign firm needs not a larger toehold but
"toeholds" in different situations. Foreign firms should be allowed to maintain
perhaps two or more toeholds, as did British Oxygen, 171 without being
be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such
anticompetitive effects.... Such a test lightens the burden of proving illegality. ... " United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (citation omitted).
166. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text.
167. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
168. See Pt. IV(A) & (B) supra.
169. Comment, Toehold, supra note 4, at 177. The FTC first adopted the toehold concept In
Bendix Corp., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. 19,288, at 21,445 (FTC 1970),
vacated and remanded, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971) (remanded because toehold theory was not
presented during administrative hearing or discussed by complaint counsel in the appeal to the
Commission). In a number of cases, the FTC has in effect created a presumption that if the
entrant could make a large acquisition, a fortiori it could, and should, enter by toehold.
Comment, Toehold, supra note 4, at 175-76. The Supreme Court has twice avoided passing on
the concept by equating toehold with de novo entry. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410
U.S. 526, 530 n.10 (1973); accord, United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 625,
632 (1974). Other courts have also sought to avoid the theory. See, e.g., Stanley Works v. FTC,
469 F.2d 498, 508 n.24 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973) (refusing to adopt FTC's
potential competition analysis but barring a merger upon a finding of foreclosure of actual
competition).
170. See note 161 supra.
171. FTC Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 13-14,
FTC v. British Oxygen Co., 1974 Trade Cas. 75,003 (D. Del.).
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regarded as having embarked on a predatory campaign. Further, when the
merger is a transnational market extension, toeholds should be allowed where
there is an absence of proof of actual perception (edge effect) by the
oligopolists. These recommendations are based upon the conclusion that the
foreign entrant does not merely have a more difficult time of it, but rather
that its behavior must be different.
The best illustration of this difference is the interrelation of the toehold
concept with the prevalence of the domestic subsidiary acquisition vehicle.
British Oxygen Co. set up two such firms in the United States, one to acquire
Airco and a second to acquire and consolidate its present domestic hold-
ings. 17 2 In the proceedings, both the court and the FTC appeared to lose sight
of the fact that these acquisition vehicles are little more than ephemeral corpo-
rate entities. When a corporation is to be used solely as an acquisition vehicle,
little more than a bank account is required.' 73 The foreign firm merely
incorporates the holding company, guarantees its loans, and the company can
begin acquiring domestic firms. 174 However, the FTC and the courts ap-
peared to be regarding the existence of these acquisition vehicles as evidence
of de novo intentions, or worse, as evidence of part of a predatory plan of
multiple acquisition. As a result, foreign firms may be penalized for not
turning these tiny companies into functioning operations.
V. CONCLUSION
Foreign firms desiring to acquire domestic companies are at a unique
disadvantage. For many reasons, a United States firm of comparable stature
is more likely to succeed in any plan of expansion into a new American
market. Foreign entrants face myriad legal obstacles to mergers. In regard to
those which apply to all mergers, foreigners are disadvantaged because of
their lack of familiarity with securities laws, monetary regulations, and state
laws, as well as with the antitrust laws themselves.'"5 Further, numerous
federal statutes operate to bar or hinder foreign entry in a fashion which is
discriminatory.
Financially, foreign companies must deal with significant economic
problems not encountered by domestic corporations. These problems include
disutility of excess production and unused resources, the unavailability of
advertising economies, and the absence of consumer recognition. Not only are
the barriers to foreign entry higher than those to domestic expansion, but also
the nature of the barriers differs widely.
172. Id. at 3.
173. "BOC Financial [the acquisition vehicle] is merely the alter ego of BOC. organized solely
for the purpose of the tender offer for the shares of Airco . Id. at 8.
174. See Young, supra note 8, at 117.
175. See Pt. IV(B) supra. The impact of the threat of antitrust action must not be minimized.
In a recent case, a simple letter by the Justice Department announcing intention to file suit halted
an acquisition of Mfiller Printing Machinery Co. by Gutehoffnungshutte Aktienverein of West
Germany two days before the takeover was scheduled. Both firms had previously operated solely
in their own countries. The takeover was postponed "indefinitely." See BNA Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. No. 718, at A-30 (June 17, 1975).
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It has been shown that the transaction of business-as well as the
achievement of mergers-across national lines is difficult. It is suggested that
the recognition of this difficulty presents a solution to the unresolved problems
of geographic market definition. 176 For both legal and economic reasons, the
choice of this nation as a whole as the relevant market appears justifiable. In
this regard the courts have been reaching a proper result, albeit thus far
unaided by any rationale. 177 However, if in any case there is evidence of a
transnational edge effect or international buying and selling of the relevant
product on a large scale, courts will still have to consider whether a larger or
a different market in fact exists.
In reviewing the nature and conduct of a foreign firm, courts must
recognize the difficulties of comparison analysis.17 8 Industry ranks and mar-
ket shares cannot be employed with the same confidence as in the past. The
potential entrant analysis must be more thorough and more penetrating. Of
all the potential competition cases, only Phillips Petroleum179 stands out as an
analysis sufficiently penetrating to serve as a model for a foreign acquisition
case. By contrast, the decisions in British Oxygen'" 0 and Texasgulf' s ' are
quite inadequate.
If the enforcement agencies and courts desire only to halt or interfere with
foreign acquisitions in this nation, then the current casual application of the
potential competition doctrine will achieve that discriminatory result. However,
if the Clayton Act is to be fairly applied, the courts must distinguish foreign cases
from domestic cases, and present modes of judicial analysis must be modified
and supplemented.
Howard R. Hawkins, Jr.*
176. See Pt. III supra.
177. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
178. See text accompanying note 165 supra.
179. United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd mem.,
418 U.S. 906 (1974), discussed in text accompanying note 164 supra.
180. FTC v. British Oxygen Co., 1974 Trade Cas. 75,003 (D. Del.) (injunction); British
Oxygen Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. 20,746 (FTC 1974) (divestiture).
181. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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